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Emerging market financial crises are characterized by an abrupt and significant shift
from net capital inflow to net capital outflow from one year to the next. By this
standard, we find ten cases of significant financial crisis among the middle-income
developing countries in the past four years: Turkey 1994; Venezuela 1994; Argentina
1995; Mexico 1994-5; Indonesia 1997-8; Korea 1997-8; Malaysia 1997-8;
Philippines 1997-8; Thailand 1997-8; Russia 1998.
1 It is the contention of this paper
that such crises typically reflect a three-stage process that hits a developed country
engaged in large-scale international borrowing.
2 In the first stage, the exchange rate
becomes overvalued as a result of internal or external macroeconomic events. In the
second stage, the exchange rate is defended, but at the cost of a substantial drain of
foreign exchange reserves held by the Central Bank. In the third stage, the depletion
of reserves, usually in combination with a devaluation, triggers a panicked outflow by
foreign creditors holding short-term claims.
The trigger of panic, in most cases, is the devaluation itself, resulting from the
exhaustion of reserves. The panicked outflow of short-term creditors leads to
macroeconomic overshooting, characterized by sharp economic downturn, typically
followed by a nearly equally sharp recovery. Various dimensions of the
macroeconomy are involved in this overshooting: real GDP (see Figure 1 for
Argentina and Mexico), the real exchange rate, real interest rates, net capital flows
(Table 1 for Argentina and Mexico), and stock market valuations (Figure 2 for
Argentina and Mexico).
                                                          
1 For further details on many of these cases see Radelet and Sachs (1998b).
2 More detailed arguments along these lines in the case of Mexico can be found in Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco
(1996a, 1996b) and in the case of East Asia in Radelet and Sachs (1998a and 1998b). Two important theoretical
treatments of these crises are Chang and Velasco (1998a, 1998b), extended to an empirical discussion of East Asia
in Chang and Velasco (1998c).4
Some observers, such as the editorial page of the Wall Street Journal, have attributed
these crises to currency devaluation, since the panics have almost always followed a
devaluation of the currency. As a result, those observers have generally concluded
that devaluations should be avoided at all costs, since the panics have almost all
followed currency devaluations. In this short note, I suggest a very different point of
view: that it is not the devaluation, but rather the GHIHQVH of the exchange rate
preceding the crisis that has often opened the door to financial panic. In my view, the
devaluation by itself is not particularly harmful, and may well be beneficial even in
the short term.
3 The harm comes mainly, or perhaps entirely, from the depletion of
foreign exchange reserves. The devaluation which follows the depletion of reserves
usually alerts the market to the exhaustion of reserves, a state of affairs which is not
fully apparent to many market participants before the devaluation takes place. When
the devaluation occurs, short-term interbank credits in particular become subject to an
abrupt, self-fulfilling loss of confidence. In summary, the devaluation signals the
depletion of reserves; the depletion of reserves signals the inability of the Central
Bank to act as a lender of last resort vis-a-vis foreign creditors; the short-term foreign
creditors flee in panic; and the macroeconomy collapses as a result of the creditor
flight. The rest of the paper describes this sequence of events, and draws some policy
conclusions from it.
,,%DODQFHRI3D\PHQWV&ULVLV
The starting point of most emerging markets crises in recent years is a balance of
payments crisis, that is, the exhaustion of foreign exchange reserves following the
defense of a pegged exchange rate. In most cases, the sequence of events is as
                                                          
3Even less harmful than a discrete devaluation is a gradual depreciation of the currency in response  to
macroeconomic shocks. Thus, the commodity exporters Australia, Canada, Chile, and New Zealand have all
weathered a terms-of-trade deterioration in 1998 through a gradual and relatively uneventful depreciation of their
currencies. Since the exchange rates were floating, and all four countries had ample forex reserves, the
depreciation of the currency did not trigger a financial panic in any of the four cases.5
follows. First, macroeconomic shocks change the full employment equilibrium ratio
of tradable goods prices Pt to nontradable goods prices Pn, a ratio we define as the
real exchange rate R (= Pt/Pn). Second, the gap between the prevailing R and the R
consistent with "internal balance" (i.e. with full employment equilibrium) leads to
speculation against the currency. Third, reserves are depleted in the defense of the
currency. Fourth, the depletion of reserves leads to a subsequent full-blown financial
panic.
We know from standard macroeconomic theory that the real exchange rate consistent
with internal balance appreciates (Pt/Pn falls) when the following events occur: (1) a
terms of trade improvement; (2) a reduction of world interest rates, leading to
increased net capital inflows; (3) a liberalization of the capital account that leads to
capital inflows; (4) a reduction of country risk, leading to increased capital inflows;
(5) fiscal expansion; (6) other positive wealth effects (e.g. a natural resource
discovery); (7) liberalization of the domestic financial system that permits increased
flows from savers to investors, thereby boosting domestic investment spending; (8) a
rise in investment as the result of increased confidence about future productivity. The
real exchange rate consistent with internal balance depreciates (Pt/Pn rises) when the
converse conditions apply.
The standard approach to real exchange rate determination is the "dependent
economy model" due originally to Salter (1959) and Swan (1960). A summary of this
model can be found in Sachs and Lorrain (1993), and a graphical representation is
given in Figure 3. The production possibility frontier PPF shows the range of tradable
and nontradable goods that can be produced in the economy. The absorption schedule
AA shows the level of domestic spending (absorption equals consumption plus
investment) that falls on the two types of goods. The farther out on the AA schedule6
from the origin, the greater is the total domestic spending. When the economy is at
point Q1, total absorption equals total production. Trade is balanced, with output and
spending on tradable goods given by the level Qlt, and output and spending on
nontradable goods given by Qln. When absorption is at level 2, beyond the PPF, then
the economy is running a trade deficit. Production takes place at point Q2, at which
non-traded goods production and absorption is given by Q2n = A2n. Tradable
production is at point Q2t, less than tradables absorption A2t. The difference, A2t -
Q2t, measures the trade deficit. When absorption is at point A3, the economy is
running a trade surplus. Production is at point Q3, with a trade surplus given by Q3t -
A3t.
As is well known, the slope of the PPF at any point is equal to the real exchange rate,
Pt/Pn. Thus, the real exchange rate is most depreciated at point Q3, and most
appreciated at point Q2. The real exchange rate at point Q1 is in between these two
cases. The key point is the following. For a given PPF, a rise of absorption (such as a
move from A1 to A2), leads to a real exchange rate appreciation. In essence, the rise
of demand provokes an increase in spending on both tradables and non-tradables. At a
given real exchange rate, this leads to an excess demand for nontradable goods, which
in turn causes a rise in the relative price of nontradables, i.e. a real appreciation. (The
increased demand for tradables is met by net imports, rather than by increased
domestic production). Contrariwise, a fall of absorption (such as a move from A2 to
A3), requires a real depreciation, as the cutback of spending on nontradables leads to
a reduction of the relative price of nontradables.
A rise in absorption, leading to a real appreciation, can arise in many macroeconomic
contexts, as noted previously. In the typical case in Latin America, real appreciation
has occured in the aftermath of stabilization from high inflation. In the typical case in7
East Asia, real appreciation resulted from capital market liberalization. Consider first
the "Latin American case" of ending high inflation. At the beginning of successful
stabilization programs, Pt/Pn tends to decline. This occurs for several reasons. First,
domestic investment spending recovers at the prospect of improved domestic
productivity. The stabilization may also lead to a consumption boom, as a result of
the elimination of the inflation tax (this occured strongly in Argentina and Brazil).
The banking sector becomes remonetized, often through the repatriation of flight
capital. This remonetization restarts domestic bank lending. Additionally, the
stabilization may trigger a reduction in the risk premium on international lending to
the country, thereby increasing net capital inflows. In the "East Asian case," capital
account liberalization (which occured in the early 1990s in Thailand, Korea, the
Philippines, and to an extent in Malaysia) led to a rise in absorption and a real
appreciation. The opening of the domestic banking sector to international borrowing
caused domestic real interest rates to fall, and provoked a large inflow of lending
from abroad, thus financing a substantial increase in investment spending as a percent
of GDP.
In both Latin America and East Asia, the policy changes also included liberalization
of the domestic banking system (e.g. a reduction of reserve requirements, an end of
interest rate ceilings, a liberalization of entry into the banking system). These changes
also contributed to a rise in domestic absorption.
The boom in domestic absorption (the rise from A1 to A2) is typically transitory: the
rapid rebuilding of the capital stock following a stabilization tends to be completed in
a few years; the boom in net capital inflows abates; the remonetization of domestic
banking systems is completed within a couple of years; and the initial consumption
boom tapers off. As a result, the pressures that lead to the initial real exchange rate8
appreciation at least partly reverse themselves, leading to pressures for real
depreciation. In a gradual (an optimal) adjustment, we might expect absorption to rise
from A1 to A2, and then to decline gradually towards A1. In practice, a financial
panic may drive the economy from A2 to A3, with harrowing consequences.
This pattern of appreciation followed by market pressures for real depreciation seems
to have been the pattern in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, as well as in the
developing countries of East Asia. Latin American stablization was followed by an
initial real appreciation, consistent with increased domestic spending and capital
inflows. After a few years, however, the spending boom and capital inflows tended to
abate, putting downward pressure on the real exchange rate. In East Asia, foreign
lending began to abate by the end of 1996 in several countries as the huge inflows of
capital financed an investment boom -- and incipient overcapacity -- by the end of
1996.
As is well known, necessary adjustments to the real exchange rate can be met either
by price movements or by nominal exchange rate movements, depending on the
exchange rate regime. The traded goods price is given by Pt = EP*t, were E is the
nominal exchange rate (in units of domestic currency per unit of foreign exchange)
and P*t is the world (dollar) price of tradable goods. The real exchange rate is then R
= EP*t/Pn. An appreciation can be brought about either through a nominal
appreciation (E falls), or a rise in the price of nontradable goods Pn. A depreciation
can be brought about either through a nominal depreciation (E rises), or a fall in the
price in the price of nontradable goods Pn.
Experience teaches that an absolute decline in Pn is difficult to achieve in a short
period of time. When the extent of needed real depreciation is large, therefore,
financial markets tend to expect that policy makers will support the relative price9
change through devaluation (or market-driven depreciation) of the nominal exchange
rate rather than by internal price deflation (i.e., the decline in Pn). Therefore, when
Pt/Pn is low relative to the market’s estimate of the value consistent with full
employment, there will almost inevitably be widespread expectations of a nominal
exchange rate devaluation (or depreciation, if the currency is simply allowed to float).
Widespread expectations of depreciation can be difficult to resist, since in almost any
economy, currency in circulation plus bank money (M2) is considerably higher than
foreign exchange reserves. This is the case even when forex reserves are sufficient to
cover highpowered money (notes in circulation plus commercial bank reserves at the
central bank), as is the case of currency board arrangements. Suppose that M2 holders
begin to convert their money into foreign exchange in expectation of a devaluation,
and suppose that the central bank defends the exchange rate, by buying high-powered
money and selling dollars. Suppose that the money multiplier mm ( = M2/Mh) is
greater than 1. In principle, each unit of high-powered money withdrawn from the
banking sector and converted into foreign exchange results in the reduction of mm> 1
units of M2. In principle, the central bank only needs forex reserves greater than or
equal to Mh, rather than M2, in order to be able to stave off a successful attack on the
exchange rate, since the reduction of Mh will lead to a multiplied reduction of M2.
This assumes, however, that the central bank will force the banking sector to shrink
outstanding loans by a PXOWLSOHof the initial withdrawal of funds. In practice, such a
contraction of loans quickly leads to illiquidity of the banks, and therefore to an
incipient bank panic. In short, money multiplication (in which a unit increase of Mh
leads to mm units of increase of M2) is not quickly reversible, since the bank loans
are tied up in non-liquid assets which can not immediately be called in by the banks.
The result is that the central bank must provide liquidity to the banking system when10
net withdrawals are made from the banking system. As a result, if money holders
begin to convert M2 into foreign exchange, the central bank will need reserves nearly
equal to M2, rather than merely Mh, in order to be able to defend the currency. Very
few central banks have sufficient reserves to cover a wholesale withdrawal of funds
from the banking sector. (To hold such a high level of reserves would also involve
large opportunity costs, since reserves typically earn less than alternative investment
opportunities available to the economy).
The main implication is that a concerted attack on the currency, one that involves—or
could precipitate—a massive withdrawal of bank money, is likely to succeed, no
matter what the resolve of the central bank. Markets understand this. Most currency
pegs are therefore vulnerable to attack when the underlying real exchange rate is
clearly overvalued relative to the level consistent with internal balance. Even if the
government tries, through a heroic credit squeeze and sky-high interest rates (which
reached overnight rates of 500 percent per annum during Sweden's ill-fated defense
of its currency in 1992), the banking sector can easily crack before the defense
establishes credibility. There are exceptions, no doubt. Perhaps Argentina and Hong
Kong will prove to have a more credible peg, as a result of the institutional
arrangements of the currency board system. Both economies have demonstrated the
willingness to "walk through fire" to defend the peg; and both countries have implicit
external backers of the currency regime (the U.S. and IMF in the case of Argentina;
China in the case of Hong Kong). In any event, time will tell. If Brazil sharply moves
the real, or China significantly devalues the yuan, both will experience another
searing test of the exchange rate regime.11
,,,&UHGLWRU3DQLF
The essence of recent emerging markets crises is that the exchange rate defense,
typically ending in a devaluation, has often been followed by a rapid and ferocious
withdrawal of credits by foreign investors. Thus, a current account deficit is not
resolved by a return to current account balance, but a virulent swing of the current
account into surplus. The crucial argument of this note is that it is financial market
SDQLF not currency devaluation, which leads to the abrupt swing of the current
account from deficit to surplus, and to acute damage to the emerging market and to
the creditors.
In emerging markets, the domestic economy (including banks, non-financial
enterprises, and government) is heavily indebted to foreign investors, including
international banks, hedge funds, and other investment funds. Much of this debt is
short-term, i.e. with maturity under one year. Additionally, much of the debt has
trigger clauses, such that repayment is immediately accelerated in the event of a
contractual default by the debtor to othercreditors. The borrowing, in general, has
been converted into long-term, relatively illiquid investments. As a result, total
short-term debt is often significantly greater than the available short-term assets that
might be mobilized to repay creditors in the event of a withdrawal of new lending. As
a rough measure, Radelet and Sachs (1998b) compare the country’s short-term debts
to international banks with the forex reserves held at the central bank, shown in Table
2. When the ratio of debt to reserves is greater than 1, the country has proven to be
particularly vulnerable to a creditor panic.
The central bank’s forex reserves are crucial since the central bank is widely, and
rightly, understood to be the lender of last resort not only to the banks, but to the12
government and corporate sector as well, in the event of an external creditor panic.
Suppose that foreign banks begin to withdraw credit lines from domestic banks,
demanding repayment of outstanding loans. This immediately leads to financial
distress in the banking system, since the banks have transformed the foreign loans
into long-term investments. The bank may, to some extent, use liquid domestic assets
to purchase dollars in the foreign exchange market, but even so, the bank is unlikely
to have sufficient liquid assets on hand to meet a large-scale withdrawal of funds.
Thus, the central bank will almost surely have to extend credit, either directly as
foreign exchange loans, or as domestic credit which is then sold in the forex market.
In the latter case, of course, the exchange rate will depreciate in the absence of
official intervention.
Once forex reserves have been depleted, the central bank’s lender of last resort
functions are deeply compromised, and understood to be so. Even if the central bank
extends domestic credit (of which there is no limit!), the exchange market
implications are likely to be dire in the event of a large, synchronized withdrawal of
creditor claims. Indeed, such withdrawals will almost surely provoke not only an
exchange rate collapse but also a suspension of debt payments if forex reserves are
depleted and the stock of short-term debts being withdrawn is large relative to trade
flows.
In these circumstances (depletion of forex reserves, a high level of short-term debt),
the economy becomes vulnerable to a self-fulfilling run. Even if fundamentals are
adequate to ensure long-term debt servicing without default, they are not adequate to
guarantee short-run debt servicing in the event of a panic. Thus, a panic can unfold
simply by the belief of creditors that it will indeed occur. In the past four years, such
panics have been triggered mainly by three types of events:13
1) the sudden discovery that reserves are less than previously believed;
2) unexpected devaluation (often in part for its role in signaling the depletion of
reserves);
3) contagion from neighboring countries, in a situation of perceived vulnerability
(low reserves, high short-term debt, overvalued currency).
It is interesting and important to stress that currency devaluation, following a long
defense of the exchange rate, has typically been the most important trigger of
subsequent panic. This seems to be the result of several factors. First, many investors
have been caught off guard by the devaluation even when it has been widely
discussed. These investors seem, incredibly enough, to have taken at face value, the
solemn commitments of governments not to devalue. Second, the devaluations are
often the signal that forex reserves are lower than publicly announced up to that point.
In Mexico in 1994, the late-December devaluation "revealed" the steep loss of
reserves in early December 1994. In Thailand, the July 2, 1997 devaluation was
followed by public announcements that the Thai Central Bank had a large book of
forward dollar sales. These dollar sales were not previously announced, and came as a
large jolt to the market. In Korea, the December 1997 devaluation was the occasion
for revealing that much of the Central Bank’s announced forex reserves were actually
illiquid claims on Korean banks, the result of preceding unnannounced deposits of the
reserves in offshore Korean banks experiencing a run on inter-bank loans (in effect,
the Central Bank had been making unannounced extensions of credit to offshore
Korean banks). Speaking in the most general terms, the collapse of pegged exchange
rate regimes have also been viewed as improper "breaches of faith" with foreign14
investors, despite the fact that such devaluations were almost always the result of
IRUFHPDMHXUHi.e. the depletion of forex reserves.
When the panic gains full force, the effects are devastating. The rational behavior of
each short-term creditor is to demand repayment as rapidly as contractually possible,
and to suspend routine inter-bank lines which support letters of credit and other
standard trade financing operations. Long-term fundamentals cease to play any role in
investor thinking, since the logic of VDXYHTXLSHXWdominates in a creditor scramble
in which creditors are serviced on a first-come, first-serve basis. The macroeconomic
results are a huge overshooting: (1) debt is drawn down even when domestic
investments (e.g. in working capital, letters of credit, etc.) have a rate of return vastly
greater than the world cost of capital; (2) the real exchange rate depreciates sharply,
far overshooting any real correction that needs to be made; (3) the current account
swings wildly from deficit to outright surplus; (4) the banking system suffers
illiquidity, and perhaps an ancillary panic by domestic savers; (5) market real interest
rates soar to astronomical levels, as each borrower scrambles to mobilize funds to
avoid default; and (6) partial default on forex obligations becomes almost assured.
The key effects on macroeconomic contraction are: (1) the collapse of bank lending
leading to a collapse of trade and production; and (2) the conversion of illiquidity into
insolvency over the course of a few months, as loans become nonperforming under
the weight of reduced production and sales, and the crushingly high interest rates on
working capital.
The implications of a bank panic may be represented in a stylized way using the two-
sector diagram. The abrupt withdrawal of credits forces the economy, dramatically,
from A2 to A3. In the full-employment model, this causes production to shift from15
Q2 to Q3, with an attendant large depreciation of the real exchange rate. In practice,
the accompanying financial distress forces the economy far inside the production
possibility frontier, to a point like Q3’. Both tradable and nontradable production are
much less than is consistent with full-employment equilibrium, since firms can not
get working capital to maintain production at feasible levels.
,9)XUWKHUGLVFXVVLRQRIWKHOLQNVRIEDODQFHRISD\PHQWVFULVLV
DQGFUHGLWRUSDQLF
So far, I have told the story in a linear way: from overvalued exchange rate to balance
of payments crisis, to foreign creditor panic. This sequencing seems to represent an
appropriate stylized description of recent crises. In theory, the linkages of balance of
payments crises and creditor panics can be considerably more complicated. The
sequence of papers by Chang and Velasco (1998a, 1998b, 1998c) provide the clearest
discussion of these issues yet available.
A complete theoretical account must recognize several distinct kinds of financial
fragility. Panics can involve several types of motivations: fear of country-level
illiquidity (total liquid forex liabilities exceed total liquid forex assets in the country);
fear of banking collapse (total liquid liabilities of banks exceed total liquid assets);
fear of exchange rate depreciation (expectations, perhaps self-fulfilling, of a capital
loss on domestic-currency assets). Each of these fears can lead to a self-fulfilling
outcome.
4 Moreover, these concerns can interact in complex ways. We have argued
that fears of a devaluation can lead to the conversion of domestic money into foreign
money, thereby draining forex reserves, and opening the country to a creditor panic.
Alternatively, the panic may start simply as a bank run, in which either foreign or
domestic bank creditors, or both, withdraw their claims on the banks out of fear of
banking-sector illiquidity. In that case, a financial panic can occur even without an16
overvalued currency. The Central Bank cannot save the banking system if the banks’
forex liabilities exceed the forex reserves available to the Central Bank (plus the
liquid forex reserves held by the commercial banks).
In short, there are many paths to financial crisis. The one described in this note: from
overvalued currency to loss of reserves to creditor panic, is just one possibility. A
plain-vanilla banking panic is another. Distinguishing among types of financial crises
are not only theoretical questions but empirical questions of considerable subtlety.
93ROLF\LPSOLFDWLRQVDQGRXWVWDQGLQJLVVXHV
The main policy issues are: (1) how to prevent a balance of payments crisis that leads
to a creditor panic; and (2) how to respond to a crisis that in fact occurs. On the first
point, the logic of these crises point to three principal policies. First, flexible
exchange rates dominate pegged exchange rates in almost all cases,since the central
bank does not need to squander forex reserves in a defense of an overvalued currency.
Even the successful peggers, Argentina and Hong Kong, do not escape the
implications of creditor panic. Argentina suffered a decline of 7 percent of GDP in
1995 in the wake of creditor panic. Hong Kong will experience an unprecedented
decline of around 4 percent of GDP in 1998. Second, short-term borrowing by
domestic banks and government should be limited as a matter of prudential policy
There is simply no excuse for allowing a high level of maturity transformation of
foreign short-term loans into domestic investments. Limits on short-term borrowing
by banks should fall under the heading of prudential standards rather than capital
controls. And yes, foreign loans should be treated differently from domestic loans,
since the ability of the central bank to be a lender of last resort on foreign borrowing
is inherently limited. Third, domestic banking regulation in the form of enhanced
                                                                                                                                                                     
4 Specifically, there are multiple equilibria. If the fear becomes widespread, the feared outcome occurs, while if
the fear is not widespread, then the outcome does not occur.17
capital adequacy standards, and policies that encourage partial banking-sector
ownership by foreign capital, take on special importance as ways of limiting
vulnerability to foreign creditor panics
With regard to policies in reaction to creditor panics, it is clear that the IMF has failed
to function as a true lender of last resort, and probably inherently so. The IMF loans
are much too small to cover potential outflows and therefore have done little to stop
creditor panics. Indeed, provocative IMF actions have probably contributed to the
panics. Moreover, the IMF’s expertise, political legitimacy, and power within debtor
countries is too limited to justify greatly expanded lending programs. More generous
IMF lending under such conditions would most likely exacerbate well-known and
much debated problems of moral hazard and distributional inequities of current
programs.
Remedies to creditor panic will therefore almost surely have to involve ways to
improve the collective response of creditors to panic-prone situations, as in domestic
bankruptcy law. This means finding mechanisms to achieve: (1) creditor standstills in
the event of extreme financial distress hitting a national economy; (2) methods for
raising fresh working capital in the midst of a creditor squeeze (analogous to
debtor-in-possession financing under the bankruptcy law); and (3) methods for
creditor-debtor bargains for stretching out loans, converting debts to equity, and
writing down claims, in the event that a panic is followed by a solvency crisis.
There are many outstanding issues—both theoretical and empirical—that bear much
greater analysis.
1) Are creditor panics the result of perceived insolvency of the debtor institutions
rather than mere illiquidity (as asserted in this note)?18
2) Who are the creditors that actually pull the plug: international commercial banks,
as seems to be the case on published data; international hedge funds and other
non-bank financial institutions; domestic savers?
3) To what extent do devaluations lead to financial crisis by signalling the depletion
of forex reserves, or by provoking balance-sheet crises due to mismatches in assets
and liabilities?
4) What are the economic forces that lead to currency overvaluation, and can these be
resolved through domestic deflation as well as nominal currency adjustments?19
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